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MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT : Summary of Intelligence Estimates on Intervention by Chinese Communists in the Korean War (12 October - 24 November, 1950)

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In compliance with your oral request, herewith is a summary of the National Intelligence Estimates published by this agency on the subject of

Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. These estimates had the concurrence

of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which is composed of the heads of the

intelligence agencies of the government.

1. On 12 October 1950 an estimate on "Critical Situations in the Far East" was prepared at the request of the President for the Wake Island

conference. This estimate stated: "The Chinese Communist ground forces,

currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening

effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict," and:

There are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist

intention to resort to full scale intervention in Korea."

After reviewing the factors favoring, and those opposing, Chinese

Communist intervention, this estimate concluded that: "while full scale Chinese

Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility,

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Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probably in 1950.

ing this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert

istance to the North Koreans."

2. On 20 October a memorandum was delivered to the President with copies

the Secretaries of State and Defense, which stated the following:

(1) (This is omitted because of reasons of source security.)

(2) [

(3) [

3. On 6 November 1950 the CIA published National Intelligence Estimate
o. 2, on the subject "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea". This
estimate stated: "Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea
is estimated at 30,000 to 40,000.", and: "Present Chinese Communist troop
strength in Manchuria is estimated at 700,000. Of this number there are
at least 200,000 regular field forces. These troop strengths, added to the
forces already in Korea, are believed to make the Chinese Communists capable
: (a) halting further United Nations advance northward, through piecemeal

United Nations

tment of troops; or, (b) forcing ~~UN~~ withdrawal to defensive positions

er south by a powerful assault."

The estimate continued: "The objective of the Chinese Communist Convention appears to be to halt the advance of United Nations forces in and to keep a Chinese regime in being on Korean soil."

It further stated: "The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea. They are free to adjust their action accordance with the development of the situation. If the Chinese Communists to succeed in destroying the effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, they would pursue their advantage as far as possible. If military situation is stabilized, they may well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are sufficient to accomplish their immediate purposes."

The next to last paragraph of the conclusions of this estimate read: Chinese Communists, in intervening in Korea, have accepted a grave risk of retaliation and general war. They would probably ignore an ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked they probably enter Korea in full force.

And the concluding paragraph of the estimate on 6 November stated:

That both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an increased risk of a general war indicates either that the Kremlin is ready for a showdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk."

Further, in the discussion portion of this estimate published on November 1950, it was stated: "The Chinese Communists could probably make available as many as 300,000 troops within 30 to 60 days for sustained ground operations in Korea and could provide limited air support and some armor."

5. On 24 November 1950, National Intelligence Estimate 2/1, a review on the subject "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea" in the light of recent developments and new information was published. The conclusions of this estimate stated: "The Chinese Communists will simultaneously:

- a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations in North Korea;
- b. Maintain or increase their military strength in Manchuria;
- c. seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means.

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"In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal by these means there will be an increasing Chinese intervention in Korea. At a minimum the Chinese will conduct, on an increasing scale, unacknowledged operations designed to demoralize UN forces in Korea, to subject them to prolonged attrition, and to maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. Available evidence is not conclusive as to whether or not the Chinese Communists are as yet committed to a full-scale offensive effort. Eventually they may undertake operations designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is estimated that they do not have the military capability of driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but they do have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communists might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea."

It should be noted that the above mentioned estimate (MIE 2/1) was published on 24 November 1950, just two days before the United Nations offensive into North Korea and the resultant full-scale Chinese Communist intervention.

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